Among the legal artifacts of international arbitration, few prove more significant in practice than the norms governing the nitty gritty conduct of proceedings in matters like evidence and discovery. In proceedings between adversaries from different countries, a transnational "soft law" often finds expression in rules, guidelines and canons of professional associations which serve to supplement the "hard law" of national statutes and court decisions. Memorializing the experience of those who sit as arbitrators or serve as counsel, such standards contain a degree of circularity, in that relevant norms both derive from and apply to cross-border arbitration.
legal culture common to participants in the arbitral process.
1 These principles build on institutional rules and professional guidelines addressing procedural questions such as presentation of evidence and conflicts of interest. 2 
Examples include International Bar
Association pronouncements (fixing rules on taking of evidence and ethical conduct), 3 along with the International Law Association recommendations on matters such as res judicata and applicable law. 4 On some topics "soft law" addresses problems lying in the interstices between substantive norms and arbitral procedure. A notable example presents itself in the body of awards addressing when arbitration clauses extend to non-signatories, a matter encompassing arbitral practice as well as contract law principles on doctrines like agency or estoppel.
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Some scholars object to the term "soft law" seeing law as having a binary character, either on or off, lacking a dimmer making norms brighter or darker. 6 In this connection, the legitimacy of "soft law" has been obscured by conflation of two notions. On the one hand, an inappropriate form of "soft law" seeks simply a fig leaf to hide an arbitrator's idiosyncratic personal preferences, pressed into service to justify derogation from a duty to apply relevant and predictable norms. On the other hand, "soft law" which represents a fruit of careful thought by experienced practitioners, hailing from different legal cultures, provides a tool to help fill procedural gaps on matters like document production, witness statements and conflicts of interest.
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Debate on the nature of "soft law" recalls the proverbial controversy over whether public international is really "law" in the same sense as national law. Clearly, differences exist. The
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, protecting buyers of footwear in Boston shops, differs in quality from the customary "law of nations" elaborated through state practice on maritime boundaries and diplomatic protection. 8 Yet each category of law serves a similar purpose. Each legal system assists those entrusted with authoritative dispute resolution by providing information on community expectations, substantive and procedural.
Much the same might be said of "soft law" norms. To ask whether the different legal orders should be lumped together as "law" may be a bit like inquiring whether chess should be called a game. Chess differs dramatically from baseball, football, squash and tennis, involving little vigorous physical activity, and lacking round objects to throw or to hit. Yet chess, just like baseball, football, squash and tennis, represents activity engaged in for amusement to which common parlance assigns "game" as a generic tag.
Sometimes "soft law" dovetails into hard law, finding its way into national court cases to fill procedural interstices. 9 This has happened, for example, in American cases involving judicial annulment of awards for "evident partiality" 10 and non-disclosure of negotiations with one side to the proceedings. 11 Thus soft-law instruments give rise to hard-law rulings providing guidance to emerging norms of a more permanent character.
II. Content of Soft Law

A. Easy Cases
Determining its content of "soft law" will be easier in some instances than in others. represents best practice, where rules and guidelines have crossed the line from the parties' will in a particular case to a broader consensus on related scenarios.
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In the category of generally accepted rules one might list principles on disclosure and witness statements, where a broad consensus has arisen that document requests must be tailored more narrowly than in United States courts, even if broader in scope than in France or Switzerland.
Similarly, it will be rare to find direct testimony in an international arbitration given orally rather than through written witness statements, with evidentiary hearings devoted to cross examination.
In each of these areas, consensus among different legal traditions yielded a hybrid of transnational procedure, initially generated in the lore of international arbitration as presented in symposia speeches and professional articles, with codification through efforts of professional associations articulating common traditions and industry standard. The allocation of costs also proves fertile breeding ground for conflicts, as between contract terms and applicable law, as well as among legal cultures. England restricts attempts to avoid the "loser pays" principle, sometimes termed "fee shifting" for legal expenses and arbitrator fees.
In advance of the dispute, parties may not tell an arbitrator to allocate costs in disregard of who wins. In contrast, the so-called "American rule" expects each side to pay its own costs regardless of the litigation outcome, absent abuse or frivolous conduct. 23 The English provision casts a wide net, catching even informed arrangements between sophisticated managers. 
A. The Arbitrator's Dilemma
As arbitral "soft law", notions of res judicata pose special intellectual challenges. From one legal culture to another, the nature of res judicata carries both considerable consensus and deep divergence. 25 The core principle of res judicata (from Latin for "a thing adjudged") holds that the same case should not be litigated twice. Thus the first decision will be considered as binding.
To say that a tribunal should recognize principles of res judicata begs the question of The Swiss approach (unlike that of many American jurisdictions) denied binding effect to the contract interpretation in first award.
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Judges who address res judicata usually look to the law of the forum, consulting published cases, civil procedure codes, and scholarly writings relating to their own jurisdiction. In some cases, arbitrators also will also be able to apply the norms of a given substantive legal system agreed by the two sides.
Not always, however. In many instances the path for arbitrators will prove less certain, due to ambiguity in the parties' choice-of-law provision.
In arbitrators remain law appliers, not law makers.
The starting point for commercial arbitrators seeking guidance would normally be the litigants' agreement itself. It will always be possible for the contracting parties to include a provision such as "questions of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion will be governed by the civil procedure law of Indiana."
The choice-of-law clause will not always, however, be drafted with such precision. Having come to the end of a long negotiation, when things are finalized at 2:18 in the morning after hard fighting on the basic commercial terms of price and delivery, the contracting parties will sometimes content themselves with simply stating, "Contract interpreted according to the law of New York." On its face, such a clause may not say much about issue preclusion.
In some instances, however, the contracting parties will go further, providing more than simply rules for contract construction. The relevant clause might say, for example, "The Contract and any matter arising therefrom, as well as the determination of any dispute related to this transaction, shall be governed by the laws of Massachusetts." From such a clause the arbitrators would likely find more assistance.
On occasion, reference to particular arbitration rules may be of assistance. Certain rules require awards to be reasoned, causing some commentators to argue that by agreeing to such rules, parties implicitly accept that the reasons given in an earlier award bind them in subsequent proceedings. 29 At least one arbitration institution revised its rules to reflect this approach explicitly.
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B. Points of Divergence: National Law
29 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 31(2) (specifying that the award will contain reasons for tribunal's decision), 34(6) (stating that the award will be binding). See also discussion, infra, Apotex II Award, ¶7.33, noting Respondent's submission on the combined effect of Articles 32(2) and 32(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, whereby reasons in the earlier award would have effect res judicata as between the Parties just as much as its operative part. 30 LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014, Article 26(8), providing "every award (including reasons for such award) shall be binding on the parties."
Overview
When the choice-of-law clause leaves loose ends, the arbitrators may be urged to adopt some transnational solution, whether labelled "soft law" or something such as international arbitral procedure. The content of any such principles, however, will not always yield to facile analysis.
National systems, like public international law and scholarly commentary, 31 recognize some res judicata principle as extended to arbitral awards. 32 Major legal jurisdictions usually look to certain "identities" that precludes re-litigation, such as (i) the same parties; (ii) the claim (petita) (also referenced as "object", "subject matter", "cause of action" or "prayer for relief"), and (iii) the same legal theory (causa petendi).
Consensus does not go much further, however. Many civil law countries understand claim (petita) narrowly as a relief sought, permitting a litigant to get a second bite at an apple. In contrast, as discussed below, for common law jurisdictions the notion of "same claim" has often been viewed broadly, so as to open doors for preclusive effect of the earlier court's determination of issues and reasoning, or the legal and factual premises on which a ruling rests. 
Claim Preclusion
Broadly speaking, claim preclusion prevents parties from rearguing a claim already decided by a competent decision-maker. In civil law countries the element of claim (petita) has often been interpreted narrowly, causing some to suggest a party must seek identical relief in the second case in order to trigger res judicata. 34 Some countries require that the second claim be founded in the same legal theory, a reading of the "unities" in res judicata that may cause a slight modification in a prayer for relief to prevent preclusive effect to the earlier decision.
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In German law, it appears that subsequent proceedings may be permitted where the parties request different relief albeit arising from the same factual circumstances. 36 Thus a car accident victim is not precluded from bringing a later case for property damages after an earlier the judgment for personal injury, even though both losses resulted from the same occurrence.
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A similar approach seems to be taken in Switzerland where notions of "claim" would be interpreted narrowly, covering only prayers for relief. English law takes the approach that all claims arising from a single event and relying on the same evidence will be treated as the same cause of action. Other than for fraud or collusion, there may be no re-litigation of the action on grounds not raised in the earlier proceedings. 44 The identity of causes of action is determined as a matter of substance. The cause of action consists of all facts and circumstances necessary to give rise to relief.
Courts in the United States American courts take a similar approach to claim preclusion. 45 . New York courts explained that "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all 
Issue Preclusion
Unlike civil law countries, common law jurisdictions usually extend preclusive effect not only to the disposition part of the award but also to the award's reasoning. 50 This is done by means of issue preclusion, also called issue estoppel, a notion that precludes a party in subsequent proceedings from contradicting an issue of fact or the legal consequences already raised and decided in earlier proceedings.
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Issue preclusion does not confer binding effect on every statement in the earlier award.
However, a determination essential to the judgment would be conclusive in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim. 53 See French civil code article 1351, limiting res judicata effect only the "dispositif" part of the award, roughly analogous to the "holding" in common law. (L'autorité de la chose jugée n'a lieu qu'à l'égard de ce qui a fait l'objet du jugement Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même ; que la demande soit fondée sur la même cause ; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée par elles et contre elles en la même qualité.) 54 Swiss ATF/BGE, 4A_633/2014, 29 May 2015. 55 Apparently, for the purposes of this second arbitration the parties changed the seat of the proceedings.
The Swiss Supreme Court concluded that the legal force of an arbitral award restricts itself to the dispositive portions, with considerations forming no part of res judicata regardless of the desirability of having transnational concepts applicable res judicata.
Other Preclusive Doctrines
Some countries developed other preclusive doctrines that go beyond traditional triple identity res judicata and nonetheless prevent litigants from taking inconsistent positions in subsequent cases. In the United States a concept of judicial estoppel serves this preclusive role.
Judicial estoppel as the traditional res judicata aims to protect the adjudicatory system from abusive use by the parties, 56 promote fairness of dispute resolution and finality of judicial rulings, and purports to avoid inconsistent results. 57 Although no uniform formulation of judicial estoppel exists in the United States, most states apply this doctrine when a party in an earlier case has relied on a position, accepted by the earlier court, which is incompatible with arguments in a second case. 58 American judicial estoppel bears some similarities to English doctrine on abuse of process, which precludes a party from raising in a subsequent proceeding issues that could have been raised during a prior proceeding. 59 Both doctrines aim to protect the integrity of the judicial system as well as parties' interests in finality. 60 In contrast, civil law countries seem less inclined to accept notions of judicial estoppel or abuse of process. Nevertheless, in some instances the doctrine of abuse of rights (abus de droit)
stands not far in function from English notion of abuse of process, 61 although the French legal tradition may be more inclined to requiring the abusive party to pay damages rather than to dismiss the second set of claims were held not to constitute "investments" for purposes of NAFTA.
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A little more than a year later, in a second arbitration, 64 a different tribunal gave res judicata effect to the earlier award, dismissing for want of jurisdiction claims brought by the same Canadian group based on the same marketing authorizations. As suggested by the dissent, one difference between the two sets of proceedings lay in the fact that the marketing authorizations relevant to the later award had been given final approval by the United States authorities, as contrasted with tentative approval to the authorizations considered in the earlier arbitrations. 65 In both sets of claims, the Canadian group manufactured generic drugs for export to the United States pursuant to authorizations permitting exclusive sales of certain generic drugs for six months following expiration of patents for the brand name drugs. In an arbitration seated in New York addressing the duration of exclusivity period, the first tribunal found that the marketing authorizations could not be considered property within the scope of NAFTA Chapter facilities. The claimants again alleged breaches of treaty-granted protections for NAFTA investors.
In response, the United States argued that the marketing authorizations were not within the definition of investment set out in NAFTA. This argument rested on an assumption that res judicata effect extended the reasoning of the first award, which defined "investment" for NAFTA purposes, rather than simply the dispositive portions relating to similar although different marketing authorizations.
By a majority vote, the 2014 Award held that that Apotex was barred from re-litigating the question of whether the marketing authorizations qualified as investments under NAFTA.
Trying to avoid making any clear choice for a the broader "common law" approach rather than the stricter "civil law" tradition, the 2014 award purported to discern no "sharp divide between these two legal systems," finding instead that courts and tribunals deciding cases under international law have taken account of a prior tribunal's "reasoning, and the argument it considered, in determining the scope, and thus the preclusive effect, of the prior award's operative part." 67 The majority found the reasoning of the 2013 award to be an integral part of its determination. 68 Consequently, the tribunal did not, in its view, apply the first award's reasons independently from its operative part.
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IV. Conclusion
The observation that the life of the law remains logic rather than experience applies with special force in exploring the role of "soft law" for cross-border arbitration. In elaborating 67 Apotex 2014 Award, ¶ ¶7.18 & 7.23. 68 Apotex 2014 Award, ¶7.35. A careful observer will note that even absent res judicata the tribunal said it would have reached the same conclusion, finding that Apotex Inc. never had any "presence, activity or other investment in the territory of the USA, including the non-payment of any relevant US taxes." Id. ¶7.62. 69 The Tribunal found additional support for its decision in choice of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for the first set of arbitration proceedings, which in Article 32 make an award final and binding and also requires a tribunal to state reasons on which the award is based. It was Respondent's case that the combined effect of those two parts of Article 32 meant that the reasons in the first award had as much effect as its operative part. The Tribunal ultimately did not have to rely on this argument, but did express an inclination "to accept this submission as a matter of legal logic." Id. at ¶7. international standards, sound analysis requires both restraint and rigor in ascertaining those principles which have, and have not, found consensus in the international community. Just as general propositions do not necessarily decide concrete cases, the propositions themselves will often prove stubbornly elusive.
In this connection, arbitrators often face particular challenges in finding res judicata principles without express application of a national legal tradition. Most legal systems accord some degree of finality to a prior judgment or award. Less agreement exists, however, with respect to questions the preclusive effect of reasoning, rather than result, and the definition of claims decided.
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On any particular topic, prophecy remains highly problematic with respect to both when and how compromise will evolve to bridge the gap between legal cultures. A measure of modesty befits any attempt to portray or to pronounce cross-border consensus. 
